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Abstract: This paper examines the debate in the wake of the 2007 flood in Jakarta, the biggest 
one to occur in the city‘s history. By analyzing textual sources both online and in the archives 
as well as interviews with several actors in the debate, I demonstrate that a new socio-
political condition in Indonesia facilitated a vibrant discourse in the wake of a so-called 
―natural disaster.‖ In a democratizing society such as Indonesia, state actors no longer 
monopolized the social production of a ―risk object‖ or a source of danger or harm. I show 
that the Indonesian public, who participated in the debate, shaped ―networks of risk objects‖ 
either by ―emplacing‖ a risk object (i.e. defining an entity as an object and linking it to a 
potential harm) or by ―displacing‖ it (i.e. challenging the existence of a risk object or delinking 
it from a putative danger) (Hilgartner, 1992). These non-state actors managed to insert 
themselves into a sphere once dominated by the technocrats, in large part because the press 
was no longer controlled by the state. In doing so they exposed the messiness and 
vulnerability of the city‘s water management system. The ―risk objects‖ they identified to run 
the whole gamut of entities that make up the entire Jakarta‘s water management socio-
technical system, which includes water technologies, laws, practices, institutions, conditions, 
policies, and the environment.    
 
Keywords: the 2007 Jakarta flood, reformation, risk objects, socio-technical system, Jakarta‘s 
water management 
 
 
Introduction 
Flooding is a recurring problem in Jakarta, Indonesia. During the rainy season 
(October – April), a flood can affect many areas of the city. In early February 2007, several 
days of torrential rainstorms were followed by a devastating flood that engulfed about 
three-quarter of the city. The deluge paralyzed Jakarta, killed dozens of residents, and 
displaced around 450,000 people. Many more fell victims to waterborne diseases such as 
diarrhea and dengue fever. Damages due to the flood were estimated at close to US$ 900 
million. It was the largest and most destructive disaster to have occurred in the most 
populous city in Indonesia. 
In an article that explores several water technologies and social relations in India, the 
U.S., and the Netherlands, Wiebe Bijker, a sociologist of technology, argues that studying 
‗things‘ of water management can help us to understand the cultural and democratic 
makeup of societies and for addressing questions about the further socio-technical 
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development of those societies.‖2  The idea that technology and culture are interrelated is 
illustrated in another of Bijker‘s article. In a comparative study of water management 
systems in New Orleans and in the Netherlands, Bijker shows that even though both 
systems function in what people regard as democratic societies, the two water 
management systems were developed differently. Bijker writes, ―The American practice 
focuses on predicting disasters and mediating the effects once they have happened—in 
brief, on ‗flood hazard mitigation.‘ Dutch practice is primarily aimed at keeping the water 
out.‖3 The two countries, in other words, have different cultures of risk management, which 
in turn shaped the design of their corresponding flood control system.  
Although many scholars have studied and written about the development of socio-
technical systems in mature democracies,4 little has been written about how an emerging 
democracy addresses the question of its socio-technical future.5  It is within such context 
that the 2007 flood disaster in Jakarta and the subsequent debate about its causes and 
solutions relevant and important to study.  Following the fall of President Suharto, the 
country‘s long time authoritarian ruler, Indonesia has been transforming into a more 
democratic society since 1998. One important consequence of the shift in the political 
situation is that technological discourses are no longer dominated by the state. The 
democratic movements paved the way for many non-state actors to participate 
enthusiastically in those discourses. In this paper, I analyze the varied responses that actors 
made in the wake of the 2007 flood, focusing particularly on how interested parties frame 
the causes and solutions to the flood problem. The debate helps understand how Jakartans 
(and Indonesians generally), explained a socio-technical disaster, perceived risk, and 
addressed the future development of the city‘s socio-technical system.   
 
 
Analytical Framework  
Actors who participated in the debate following the 2007 Jakarta flood had different 
reasons and objectives. Although their visions seemed to be united by a desire to prevent 
or mitigate future flooding, embedded in their arguments was a bigger aspiration to 
influence the direction of their city‘s development according to what they thought was 
right. The strategies they employed both discursively in the media and materially on the 
ground illustrate the mechanism by which the development of Jakarta‘s societies and their 
water infrastructure are co-constitutive.  
In mapping the debate, I use the concept of ―risk objects,‖ which are defined as 
―things that pose hazards, the sources of danger, the entities to which harmful 
consequences are conceptually attached.‖6 I argue that actors use the flood episode to 
socially construct networks of risk objects for a variety of reasons and they do so in two 
                                                        
2 Wiebe Bijker, ―Dikes and Dams, Thick with Politics,‖ Isis, vol. 98 no. 1 (2007), p. 110 (my emphasis on the 
word ―sociotechnical‖).  The term ―sociotechnical‖ was first coined by Thomas P. Hughes in his book Networks 
of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1983), p. 140, the term refers to an integrated system that consists of both technical and non-technical 
things that make up and interact with one another to produce a noticeable effect. 
3 Wiebe Bijker, ―Dikes and Dams, Thick with Politics,‖p. 120. 
4 For examples, see Bijker ―Dikes and Dams,‖ and Sara B. Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and 
the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
5 See Sulfikar Amir, ―Challenging Nuclear: Antinuclear Movements in Postauthoritarian Indonesia,‖ East Asian 
Science, Technology and Society 2009 and Schiller, J., Lucas, A., & Sulistiyanto, P., ―Learning from the East 
Java Mudflow: Disaster politics in Indonesia,‖ Indonesia, 85 (April 2008), 51–77. 
6 Stephen Hilgartner, ―The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or, How to Pry Open Networks of Risk,‖ in 
James F. Short, Jr. and Lee Clarke (editors), Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk (Boulder, CO, San 
Francisco, CA, and Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1992), p. 41. 
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ways. Actors either ―emplace‖ a risk object (i.e. defining an entity as an object and linking it 
to a potential harm) or they ―displace‖ it (i.e. challenging the existence of a risky object or 
delinking it from a putative danger).7 Different actors can have different interpretations of 
the same risk object and their understanding of which one needs to be controlled informs 
the kind of solution they propose. One important reason we need to understand how and 
why people construct risk objects is because such construction has political ramifications. 
Political actors deflected the blame directed at them by severing the conceptual link a risk 
object has with a presumed harm. Some of them argued, for example, that the 2007 flood 
was a natural disaster, not caused by the government‘s inadequate preparation and 
handling for such catastrophe.  This way of framing the cause of flooding allowed the 
Jakarta government to ―disown‖ the problem, shifting ―causal, moral, and political 
responsibility‖ of flooding onto another risk object.8 
I will also show that in addition to wanting to control or displace a risk object, actors 
proposed a solution to achieve a certain political objective. One political goal that I think 
was embodied in the debate about flood mitigation and prevention in Jakarta reflect a 
desire to advance the standing and the role of one‘s institution in the eyes of the public and 
the state.  Some of the proposed technological interventions mirror a contestation between 
a centralized approach and a more democratic participation of socio-technical decision-
making. Most of the state-sponsored projects aimed to strengthen the role of the state or 
state institutions, while other projects, typically advocated by non-state actors, aspire to 
achieve a more participatory approach to making technological decisions. In this paper, I 
highlight two proposed solutions that illustrate the competition of the two approaches in 
shaping the city‘s future socio-technical system. 
 
 
Situating the 2007 Flood in Indonesia’s Sociopolitical Context 
Despite the regular occurrence of flooding, the 2007 flood took many Jakartans by 
surprise. The severity and the scope were much larger than many anticipated.  Not only did 
the flood affect the low-lying areas in the northern part of the city, but it also submerged 
many more areas that had been previously spared by the floodwater, including several 
affluent neighborhoods.  
One Jakarta resident after having lived on her rooftop for 7 days and 7 nights was 
glad that she was finally rescued. She also said that for the rest of her life she would not 
forget the experience. What baffled her though, was the severity of the flood. She was 
quoted in a weekly news magazine to say, ―Five years ago, the water level was just two 
meters, now it is more than four meters,‖ she said referring to the last major flood in 2002 
that also partly submerged her dwelling. 9 Another illustrative quote comes from Admiral 
Bernard K. Sondakh, the country‘s Navy Chief of Staff at the time, who lived at the Naval 
Officers residential complex in Kelapa Gading, a wealthy neighborhood. He was very taken 
aback by the severity of the flood. ―I never imagined the floods would be so devastating,‖ 
he said.10   
The 2007 flood was not the only disastrous episode to have occurred in Indonesia in 
the past decade. Prior to this, a series of disasters and accidents such as the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami that swept Aceh and the island of Nias, the Yogyakarta earthquake and the 
hot mud flow in Sidoarjo, East Java in May 2006, prompted a number of Indonesians to 
                                                        
7 Hilgartner, ―The Social Construction of Risk Objects,‖ pp. 48-50. 
8 Hilgartner, ―The Social Construction of Risk Objects,‖ p. 43. 
9 ―Di Balik Banjir Jakarta,‖ Tempo, 18 February 2007, p. 90. 
10 ―Naval Rescue,‖ Tempo English Edition 19 February 2007, p. 57. 
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speak out for the need of better disaster preparedness (one proposal is to mobilize the 
military) and the awareness of living in precarious environments.11  Their calls for changes 
in the culture of disaster preparation and mitigation illustrate that even ―natural disasters‖ 
will, in the words of Stephen Hilgartner, ―inevitably implicate human artifacts, 
organizations, and choices.‖12  
In addition, a number of public transportation accidents that occurred in 2006 and 
early 2007 eroded the public‘s trust in the government to prevent and handle socio-
technical disasters.13 They lost their trust in the government‘s capacity to protect them 
from harms. As Langdon Winner argues, in a democratic society, trust is an important 
element that the public needs to cope with the vulnerability of their socio-technical world. 
According to Winner, the public reasonably expect, ―that key technologies will always work 
reliably and not break down in ways that jeopardize [their] health, safety and comfort.‖14 
In the light of these other disasters, the motivations for the various actors who 
participated in the debate about Jakarta's floods were high. Many people were united in 
their desire to reduce the incidence and severity of flooding in the future. They didn‘t want 
the same major flood to occur again in the city because it was a big ordeal for them. Some 
people's lives were also at stake. Many believe that Jakarta's development was headed in 
the wrong direction and parts of the city would be permanently under water in the future, 
unless something were to be done to prevent it immediately. They were also concerned 
about the diminishing carrying capacity of the city to support the continually increasing 
population.  Put in another way, the public wanted assurances from the government that 
they could trust public officials to reduce the risk of flooding in Jakarta by doing something 
about it. 
The issue of trust, I think, was also in the mind of a number of government officials.  
Some state actors wanted to be perceived to be more responsible in handling disaster (i.e. 
to be more accountable to the public). To Fauzi Bowo and Adang Daradjatun, who ran as 
candidates in the first-ever Jakarta‘s gubernatorial election in August 2007, the stake was 
the outcome of the election. They wanted Jakartans to think that they cared and had 
solutions to the flood problem.  Prior to August 2007, Jakarta‘s governors were appointed 
by the Jakarta‘s Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD), usually with a nod from the president. Sutiyoso, who was appointed governor in 
1997 and was the city‘s governor when the 2002 flood occurred, had a little political stake 
in the debate following that flood. He did not have to answer to Jakarta residents who did 
not elect him. In fact, the Jakarta‘s parliament elected him again for his second and last 
term in 2002.  
Equally important to note is that the debate following the 2007 Jakarta flood was 
made possible, in large part, by a shift of the sociopolitical condition in the country. The so-
called reformasi era began after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia‘s second and longest serving 
president, on May 21, 1998. The sudden and quite unexpected timing of his resignation 
came after days of student protests and riots in Jakarta.  Initially, the students protested the 
increased prices of fuel and other essential goods after the government, following a 
                                                        
11 Roch Basoeki Mangoepoerojo, ―Tentara di Negeri Bencana,‖ Kompas 19 June 2006; Lily Yulianto Farid, 
―Hidup di Negara Rawan Bencana,‖ Kompas 1 April 2005. 
12 Stephen Hilgartner, ―Overflow and Containment in the Aftermath of Disaster,‖ Social Studies of Science 
37/1, 153-158, p. 153. 
13 Adam Air Flight 574 disappeared near Polewali, Sulawesi on 1 January 2007, passenger ferry Levina 1 caught 
fire in Java Sea on 22 February 2007 and later sunk, and another Adam Air airplane that broke its fuselage upon 
landing on Juanda airport in Surabaya on 21 February 2007. 
14 Langdon Winner, ―Trust and terror: The vulnerability of complex socio-technical systems‖ Science as 
Culture, 13 no. 2 (June 2004), pp. 155–172.  
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prescription by the IMF, pulled out gasoline subsidies in order to receive funds from the 
international agency. The Indonesian government needed the bailout money to remedy the 
economic situation following the Asian financial crisis that started a few months earlier. 
When in early May a peaceful student demonstration resulted in six college students shot 
and several wounded, riots followed and engulfed the city. Suharto, who was in Egypt at 
that time, cut his overseas trip short to address the mounting political crisis.  He promised 
to reshuffle his cabinet and to implement reform, but several ministers decided not to rejoin 
his new cabinet. In the mean time, more public figures called for Suharto‘s resignation and 
students made their way to the parliament building and occupied it for a few nights. Three 
days after a televised address in which Suharto announced that a new election would be 
held and he would not run again, he resigned and Vice President B.J. Habibie was sworn in 
as the new leader.  
What followed was a tumultuous period that marked political struggles among the 
ruling elites and between the state and the emerging civil society. President Habibie only 
managed to stay in power for a little over a year. Following the October 1999 general 
election, Abdurrahman Wahid (widely known as Gus Dur) was elected the president by the 
parliament.   Two years later, he was removed from office by the same parliament because 
of his controversial style of governance, and Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri was 
appointed the new leader of the country. In an unprecedented direct presidential election in 
2004, Megawati lost her re-election bid, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly 
known by his acronym SBY) won the popular vote and was sworn in as Indonesia‘s fourth 
president since Suharto‘s fall. 
The revolving door of leadership at the top had several consequences for governance 
in Jakarta. The emerging civil society often took their concerns to the streets. The city 
between the late 1990s up until early 2000s, according to Merlyna Lim, became 
―a‗demopolis‘—literally a ‗demos‘s polis‘—a city ruled by people, or a democratic city; and 
a demo-polis, a city always teeming with demonstrations. Street demonstrations were held 
every day and became something of a routine.‖15 In an effort to suppress these protests, the 
Sutiyoso administration ―renovated‖ the Hotel Indonesia Roundabout (Bunderan Hotel 
Indonesia), the most popular site of holding the demonstrations, to make it more difficult 
for people to congregate. Despite an effort to ―discipline the public space,‖ Jakartans 
learned that they could use civic spaces to voice their concerns.16   
The current Indonesian democracy, thus, has the following characteristics: emerging 
civil societies as indicated above, free elections of many public officials from the presidency 
on down to mayor ship, multi-party political system and competitions among those parties 
to gain power, free press, and decentralization of power. But despite these gains, one 
scholar notes that money politics and corruptions are still rampant.17   
The implications of the political shift are quite significant. Before the reformasi era, 
particularly during Suharto's New Order, the state dominated socio-technical decision-
makings. Many projects (typically large projects) were launched and built to achieve the 
political legitimacy of the New Order regime by claiming those projects as projects of 
national importance. Two examples are the state-owned aircraft industry18 and the 
                                                        
15 Merlyna Lim, ―Transient Civic Spaces in Jakarta Demopolis‖ in Globalization, the City and Civil Society in 
Pacific Asia: The Social Production of Civic Spaces, ed. Mike Douglas, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 220. 
16 Lim, ―Transient Civic Spaces in Jakarta Demopolis,‖ p. 225. 
17 Vedi R. Hadiz, ―Indonesia a Decade After Reformasi: Continuity of Change?‖ ISEAS conference paper, 2008, 
p. 2. 
18 Sulfikar Amir, ―Nationalist rhetoric and technological development: The Indonesian aircraft industry in the 
New Order regime,‖ Technology in Society, vol. 29 (2007), pp. 283–293. 
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launching of a communications satellite called Palapa.19 Nowadays, non-state actors are 
openly and actively engaged in public decision-making, including those related to 
technology. For the first time in many years, the public was made aware of the multitude of 
problems the 2007 flood exposed. The flood episode along with the shift in political setting 
opened the floodgate, so to speak, of discussions.   Government‘s proposed solutions, 
technological interventions, and policies are constantly under scrutiny. Many actors used 
the 2007 flood to make all kinds of critiques, not just of the city's built environment, but 
also about Indonesian democratic practices in general. 
 
 
Mapping the Flood Debate 
One way to conceptualize the 2007 flood debate is to analyze it as a social 
construction of risk objects. One part of the debate, for example, revolves around the issue 
of land subsidence in the city. Many actors argued that this situation poses a dangerous 
consequence. They said that the city has been sinking and coupled with the rise of sea 
level, much of North Jakarta could be permanently submerged unless the city did 
something to prevent it now.20  One dire warning came from Hongjoo Hahm, the lead 
infrastructure specialist at the World Bank in Jakarta at the time. He claimed that the State 
Palace, which is located in the middle of the city, could one day have a ―sea-front view.‖21 
The institution where Hahm worked had proposed a solution to mitigate future flooding. 
Recently the World Bank has agreed to finance a massive, multi-year dredging effort to 
return the original capacities of rivers and drainage canals in Jakarta.22 Jakarta Globe, the 
newspaper that ran a special issue on Jakarta‘s water woes on its July 24, 2009 edition 
supported this proposed technological intervention.  Noting that Jakarta‘s water problems 
involve ―the supply [of potable water], the [absence of] sewage [system], the floods, the 
garbage, [and] the tides‖ the newspaper pointed to those five entities as risk objects that 
need to be controlled.23 Almost exclusively, the paper cited the World Bank‘s assessment of 
the city‘s conditions and the bank-sponsored dredging project as a viable solution to 
manage all of those risks. But taking such a stand is not the monopoly of Jakarta Globe. 
Other newspapers are also inclined to highlight certain solutions to solve the flood 
problem. Republika, another daily that is widely read by Jakartan Muslims, published an 
interview with the inventor of biopore holes who invoked a verse from the Qur‘an as an 
aspiration for inventing the technology, something that would surely appeal to many 
Republika readers. 24 In the hope of gaining wider readership, Republika featured a number 
of articles about the biopore holes.  
Other actors also mentioned the risk associated with a sinking city. One official with 
the country‘s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (Badan Meteorologi 
Klimatologi dan Geofisika, BMKG) explicitly pointed out the dangerous effect of land 
subsidence and that the city needs to address this ―non-meteorological factor‖ 
                                                        
19 Joshua Barker, ―Engineers and Political Dreams: Indonesia in the Satellite Age,‖ Current Anthropology, 46, 
no. 5, (December 2005), pp. 703-727. 
20 Rieska Wulandari and Reynold Sumayku, ―Pesisir Jakarta: Menata Timbunan Masalah Dengan Masalah,‖ 
National Geographic Indonesia, July 2008. 
21 Putri Prameshwari, ―The Tides,‖ Jakarta Globe, 24 July 2009. 
22 World Bank, ―Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project‖. The documents can be accessed online at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P111034/jakarta-urgent-flood-mitigation-project?lang=en (accessed on 
19 March 2015). 
23 ―Water Worries: What‘s Wrong With Jakarta‘s Water and What Can Be Done?‖ Jakarta Globe, 24 July 2009. 
24 ―Membangun Istana Cacing,‖ Republika, 20 May 2007. 
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immediately.25 In this example, an actor explicitly links an object and a presumed harm. 
But participants in the flood debate did not just point to one risk object; they often 
constructed a chain of risk objects (i.e. chain of causations) in the discourse. The city was 
sinking, they pointed out because in large part there was an inadequate potable water 
supply to Jakarta residents, which requires many buildings to draw water from the 
underground aquifers. And since there was no clear regulation about aquifer discharge, the 
rate of water pumping was shown to be larger than the rate of recharge.26 Other actors, 
such those who worked for the Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, admitted that part 
of the reasons that there was not enough drinking water for the city‘s residents was because 
there was inadequate raw water that could be processed by the city‘s state-owned water 
operator Perusahaan Air Minum Jaya, or PAM Jaya.27 The main reason for this, they 
asserted, was polluted surface water, which in turn was caused by the trash and other 
pollutants that were being dumped into the rivers and canals by squatters and factories. 
Factories did it because they did not want to treat their waste and they were able to do this 
because laws regulating industrial waste disposal were hardly enforced. The reason that 
they were many urban poor living on the river embankments was due to rapid urbanization, 
which was caused by centralized development in Jakarta, and so on. Firdaus Ali, a 
University of Indonesia environmental engineer once told me, ―it‘s a flood of people, not a 
flood of water [that we have here].‖28    
Rapid urbanization was invoked not only as a risk object, but also as the result of 
uneven development occurring in the country, a risky endeavor.  Ivan A. Hadar, a director 
of the Indonesian Institute for Democracy Education (IDe), wrote an op-ed piece 
highlighting the unevenness of development by saying that two-third of the foreign 
investment and forty-five percent of domestic capital was put in Jakarta during the three 
decades of the New Order rule. As a result, he wrote, ―It is no wonder the population has 
always been increasing, from 450,000 in 1930 to 9.8 million in 1995 and about 12 million 
today.‖29 Deden Rukmana, an urban studies and planning professor at Savannah State 
University was more direct in his criticism about this issue. In a 2008 blog post, he disputed 
the claim made by Basah Hernowo, the director of forestry and water resource 
conservation at the National Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas), that the flood was caused by poor drainage system, a 
risk object that some actors identified. Rukmana wrote,  
 
Neither improving the drainage system nor dredging the canal and rivers is a 
sustainable solution for the annual floods in Jakarta. The annual floods are strong 
evidence that rapid urbanization in Jakarta must be reduced. One way to reduce the 
rapid urbanization in Jakarta is to eliminate the pull factor of urbanization. One major 
pull factor of urbanization in Jakarta is its function as economic, commercial, cultural 
and transportation hub of the nation as well as the capital of the country. Indonesia 
needs to redistribute the central functions from Jakarta to other parts of the nation and 
create more urban agglomerations to pull urbanization away from Jakarta. Relocating 
central functions out of Jakarta will not only make Jakarta more sustainable but also 
create regional equality in Indonesia.30 
                                                        
25 ―Banjir Pantai Terjadi Sampai April,‖ Kompas 14 January 2008. 
26 Titania Febrianti and Reynold Sumayku, ―Air Bersih Jakarta,‖ National Geographic Indonesia, August 2009. 
27 Semi-structured interview with Firdaus Ali through email, 4 September 2009. 
28 Interview with Firdaus Ali, Jakarta, 12 June 2009.  
29 Ivan A. Hadar, ―Banjir dan Daya Dukung Ekologis,‖ Kompas, 7 February 2007. 
30 Deden Rukmana, ―Jakarta Annual Flooding in February 2008,‖ February 5, 2008. 
http://indonesiaurbanstudies.blogspot.com/search?q=banjir+jakarta (accessed 30 September 2009). 
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A growing chorus of such criticism was aimed to dispel the notion that technological fix 
alone (one attempt to control risk objects) would solve the flood problem.  
The chain of causation that the actors created in the debate, though theoretically can 
be indefinited, often stopped at an endpoint, particularly when they wanted to propose a 
solution. For example, along one the chains of causation I highlight above, several solutions 
had been proposed to control or displace a risk object associated with a sinking city. 
Several actors, for instance, argued for the need to dredge the rivers and canals to solve the 
surface water pollution problem. In fact, the Jakarta provincial government (Pemerintah 
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, Pemda DKI Jakarta) planned to dredge all the rivers and 
drainage canals in the city and it tried to come up with a solution to relocate the people 
who were living on the river embankments and along reservoirs.31 One of my interviewees 
wondered why could not Jakarta pipe spring (and thus potable) waters that are abundant in 
the mountainous region located south of the city.  Many cities in Europe, he told me, 
channel their potable water using underground pipes. This way, he said, aquifer pumping 
and subsequently land subsidence could be halted and the city‘s water supply problem can 
be solved.32  In suggesting this solution, he intended to displace a risk object (aquifer 
pumping) by not taking into considerations other processes such as the need to supply and 
treat raw water. The assumption embedded in his argument was that laying underground 
pipes from areas outside Jakarta‘s jurisdiction would pose no issues both technologically 
and politically. Perhaps there would be a little technological problem. But in the climate of 
decentralization during the reformasi era, provincial governors and many sub-district heads 
have been trying to exert their authority in governing their regions more than before. Piping 
water from sources outside the jurisdiction of Jakarta could potentially create a conflict that 
would not be easy to negotiate. One indication of this potential conflict lay in the difficulty 
that the Jakarta‘s government in pushing its proposal to enlarge the administrative area of 
the city to include its neighboring regions and towns. This proposal came from Sutiyoso, 
Jakarta‘s former governor, who reasoned that since Jakarta‘s rivers originate in the south 
and the 2007 flood inundated neighboring areas, Jakarta would not be able to solve the 
flood problem alone: it needed to have a larger administrative area, a concept he termed 
the ―Jabodetabekjur megalopolis.‖33 Sutiyoso also believed that this proposal would be able 
to solve other issues that the city faces including garbage, urbanization, transportation, 
pollution, housing, poverty, and water supply.  But the then governor of the neighboring 
new province, Banten, created using the country‘s decentralization law, resisted this effort. 
In the midst of the debate of this proposal, she was quoted as saying,  
 
As a governor I welcome the idea of the formation of the megapolitan concept if the 
only goal is to integrate spaces in the three provinces. But we ask that this concept 
does not impinge on the autonomy of Banten as a province because [Bantenese] has 
fought a long [battle] to create the province of Banten.‖34 
 
Another solution to solve the water supply problem, quite prominent among the many 
solutions proposed, is to build a long, underground water and road tunnel from central to 
North Jakarta along the Ciliwung River, one of the more than a dozen rivers that pass 
                                                        
31 Dewi Kurniawati, ―Dredging the Rivers Means Uprooting Thousands of Squatters,‖ Jakarta Globe, 24 July 
2009. One successful attempt to relocate squatters along a reservoir in Jakarta called Waduk Pluit was 
successfully carried out by then Governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo and his Deputy Governor Basuki Cahya 
Purnama in 2013. 
32 Interview with one of my informants, Jakarta, 17 June 2009. 
33 Jabodetabekjur is a portmanteau word of Jakarta and its neighboring cities and regions: Bogor, Depok, 
Tangerang, Bekasi, and Cianjur. 
34 Anita Yossihara, ―Cukup Memadukan Tata Ruang,‖ Kompas, 17 February 2007. 
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through the city. Dubbed the Multi Purpose Deep Tunnel (MPDT), its proponents claimed 
that not only would it solve Jakarta‘s water supply issues (by collecting, channeling, and 
storing runoff water in an underground water cistern), but also (and more importantly) 
reduce the risk of flooding, collect and treat sewage, facilitate river restoration, recharge 
aquifers, prevent seawater intrusion, and alleviate traffic congestion. This particular 
solution attempts to control multiple risk objects simultaneously. In fact, the multi 
functionality of the proposal gained the attention of Governor Sutiyoso who readily 
adopted the idea and sold it aggressively to Jakartans.35 Another aspect of the proposal that 
appealed him was the promise of sidestepping the problem of land appropriation and 
compensation,36 an issue that continues to plague the construction of the East Canal Flood 
(Banjir Kanal Timur, BKT), a technological project that was under construction in 2007 to 
mitigate flooding.37    
Other people, however, perceived the canal as more an emplacement of a risk object 
rather than an attempt to displace another. Many believed that the canal itself would 
contribute to the increased risk of flooding because the idea behind it is to channel water 
out to the sea quickly instead of allowing the water to percolate underground to recharge 
the aquifers. Mulyono Karim, a Kompas reporter, criticized the East Canal Flood project, 
asserting that the real problem lies in Jakarta‘s conventional drainage system, which was 
based on an outdated principle of collecting and delivering rainwater quickly to the Jakarta 
Bay.  What Jakarta needs is a new concept he dubbed ―eco drainage,‖ whereby rainwater 
should be allowed to seep into the ground as much as possible. Instead of building the East 
Canal Flood, Jakarta would be better served by building more parks, inner city woods, and 
seepage wells, he opined.38  Using a similar reasoning, there was another proposed solution 
that was gaining the public‘s attention, called the biopore holes (Lubang Resapan Biopori, 
LRB). The concept behind this technical intervention was to displace a risk object 
(impermeable topsoil and concrete surface) that contributed to land subsidence, by 
transforming the soil condition to allow rainwater to recharge underground water. 
Land subsidence and inadequate water supply were not the only risk objects that 
actors in the debate constructed. Several actors pointed to the practices of deviating from 
the city‘s first master plan as the primary cause of flooding. One of them is Garundono, 
Deputy Head of the Committee for the Evaluation of Urban Environment, who contended 
that the Jakarta administration didn‘t build the Capital according to the city‘s original 
master plan.39 The first post-independence comprehensive city planning, called the Master 
Plan 1965-1985 (Rentjana Induk Djakarta 1965-1985), was drawn up in the 1960s by the 
then Governor Sumarno‘s administration and later adopted by his successor, Ali Sadikin. 
This master plan specified that the eastern region of Jakarta (including what is now the 
regularly flooded Kelapa Gading neighborhood) to be part of a horseshoe-shaped open 
spaces (greenbelt) encircling the city (Figure 1).  
 
                                                        
35 ―Proyek Mega Mencegah Banjir,‖ Gatra, 31 May 2007. 
36 Semi-structured interview with Firdaus Ali through email, 4 September 2009. 
37 ―The Eastern Flood Canal Feeding Frenzy,‖ Tempo English Edition, 9 April 2007. 
38 Mulyawan Karim, ―Drainase Jkt, Tak Terpelihara dan Ketinggalan Zaman,‖ Kompas  3 February 2007. 
39 ―Bursting at the Seams,‖ Tempo English Edition, 19 February 2007. 
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Sumber: Rentjana Induk Djakarta 1965-1985 
 
Figure 1. Open Spaces 
 
The idea was to have these green areas reserved for parks that Jakartans could enjoy 
and to absorb rainwater. But these planned parks, inner city woods, and water catchment 
areas were later erased in the subsequent 1985-2005 Master Plan. In their place, a concrete 
jungle was erected instead. Malls and luxury apartment complexes mushroomed in the last 
decade. There are about one hundred malls in Jakarta today, in the capital city of a country 
with an average income of USD1300 per year.40  As a result, the city‘s 2010 Master Plan 
devotes an even smaller portion of the city to open spaces since many of these areas have 
been converted to built-environment.41 When actors spoke out about this issue, they 
tended to point to broader underlying problems; predatory business interest and corrupt 
government officials. Eko Budiharjo, a professor of architecture and former rector of the 
University of Diponegoro, summed up the effects of these practices on Jakarta by saying, 
―spatial planning in Indonesia is no different from money planning…whoever has the 
strong finances will determine the face and the fate of the city.‖42  Big Business, typically 
represented by powerful real estate developers, and the corrosive practices of corruption 
were emplaced as risk objects in the network. 
                                                        
40 Heri Susanto, ―Jakarta, Mall City,‖ Tempo English Edition, 6 November 2006. 
41 ―Ongkos Ekonomi Yang Mesti Dibayar,‖ Kompas, 11 February 2007. 
42 Eko Budiharjo, ―Kota-kota yang Terluka,‖ Kompas, 6 February 2007. 
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Some actors, however, tried to resist the emplacement of risk objects mentioned 
above by trying to sever the link that those objects have with any supposed dangers. 
Instead they emplaced a new risk object by faulting the environment. They claimed that the 
2007 flood was part of the ―cyclical nature‖ of big floods that come in five-year cycles. The 
―five-year cycle‖ floods dominated the rhetoric especially among members of the political 
elite; Governor Sutiyoso is a well-known one among them.  They kept invoking this as if it 
were a fact, largely to dismiss alternative explanations of the cause of flooding. This claim 
has, of course, been disputed (i.e. displaced) by a number of people. One of them is a 
climatologist with the Bandung Institute of Technology. Dr. Armi Susandi contended that 
the past three big floods spanning twelve years did not provide enough data to assert the 
five-year cycle theory. In an article published in the daily Kompas, he was quoted to say 
that only a layperson would say that Jakarta‘s big flood comes in five-year cycles.43  The 
way Susandi framed his argument, I think, served two purposes. Not only did he want to 
definitively discount the nature-causes-the-flood theory, but he also wanted to exert his 
authority as a noted scientist. This way, he lent credibility to Kompas‘s assertion that the 
five-year-cycle flood is a myth.   
The examples above illustrate that actors identified a variety of objects, which can be 
things, events, conditions, or even behaviors and linked them as the sources of or the 
entities that pose risk to flooding in the city. The examples also show how different actors 
understood the flood differently. Often (though not always), their organizational affiliation, 
educational background, professional experiences, and sociopolitical standing shaped those 
varied understandings. In their rhetoric actors emphasized some risk objects more so than 
the others.  One important consequence was that although the networks of risks 
constructed were complex, only certain risk objects and technological proposals to control 
them gained the public‘s attention. For example, there was an academic who recounted the 
successful story of the city of Curitiba in Brazil that managed to solve its urban problems 
similar to the ones that Jakarta was facing.  Drawing the lessons from that particular case 
study Eko Budiharjo, a professor of architecture and a member of the National Commission 
on Habitat, proposed what he termed the ―Ten Commandments of Sustainable Urban 
Development,‖ which were ecological balance (environment), providing jobs 
(employment), enabling society (empowerment), obeying the law (enforcement), involving 
private entities (engagement), ensuring the comfort of city residents (enjoyment), 
employing the ethics of development, upholding justice (equity), practicing energy 
conservation, and paying attention to environmental aesthetics.44 Although quite 
persuasive, this proposal, like many other proposals put forth by other individuals did not 
garner much attention.  It was drowned, so to speak, by other proposals. 
The fact that many actors came up with many solutions to mitigate Jakarta‘s floods 
did not necessarily mean that their solutions would be readily adopted by the city 
government or by the public, either. Proponents of each of these proposals competed to 
gain wide public support as well as political backing. When certain proposals fell out of 
favor or did not get enough attention, they would employ any number of combinations of 
the following tactics to convince either the public or decision makers to use their 
technologies: writing op-ed articles, holding press conferences, conducting interviews with 
the media, holding seminars, or preparing presentations and videos about their 
technologies. They did so, I argue because they wanted to achieve a desired political goal 
with their technical interventions and proposals. In this case, the technology and political 
maneuvering went hand in hand. In the next two sections, I will highlight two of the well-
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known proposals to illustrate the intertwining relationship between technology and politics: 
the MPDT and the biopore holes. 
 
 
Multi Purpose Deep Tunnel (MPDT) 
Out of the many state-sponsored technological proposals to solve Jakarta‘s flood 
problem, perhaps the Multi Purpose Deep Tunnel (MPDT) was illustrative of the kind of 
centralized effort favored by the state. But unlike many other state-backed projects, this 
particular solution promised not only to solve Jakarta‘s flooding and other related 
problems, but also claimed to be a revenue-generating enterprise, the kind that Jakarta 
government preferred. The income factor was a very important aspect, one of the project 
proponents told me because it would ensure the continual operation and maintenance of 
the system in the long run.45  Many public infrastructure projects in the city suffer from lack 
of maintenance, many people said since not enough funding was available. The earnings 
from MPDT would be generated from collecting the toll fees from the tunnel‘s multi-lane 
highway users, selling the collected rain water to PAM Jaya, and selling the processed solid 
waste from its sewage treatment facility as bio fertilizer.  Despite the seemingly profitable 
aspect of the project, there was no consensus among the actors in the flood debate that this 
is an important factor to consider in creating an infrastructure to control flooding in the 
city.   It seemed that proponents the tunnel added this feature to help sell the idea to the 
Jakarta administration. 
The tunnel was also touted as a green technology because the tunnel highway 
ventilation system wanted to incorporate a carbon capture mechanism and to run on 
methane gas generated from anaerobic process of the liquid waste collected by the 
tunnel.46  In other words, the technology promised to produce all kinds of material 
effectiveness. In the case of MPDT, the Jakarta government under Governor Sutiyoso liked 
the proposal, adopted it immediately, and advocated it vigorously.47  Since the technology 
was claimed to be modeled after the Chicago‘s Deep Tunnel Reservoir System (DTRS) and 
the Kuala Lumpur‘s Storm Water and Road Tunnel (SMART), Sutiyoso and his entourage 
paid a visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in late July 2007 to study how SMART works.48 
Firdaus Ali, the vocal champion of this proposal admitted that he first conceived the 
technology to solve the problem of raw water supply (and it is still the main objective), but 
he said that it would solve the flood problem, too.  Entrenched in the proposal, I think are 
hidden political agendas.  Sutiyoso wanted to use this proposal to bolster his proposed 
Jabodetabekjur megalopolis concept since the two were in tandem with each other. The 
Jabodetabekjur would provide the administrative while the tunnel would provide the 
technological means to solve Jakarta‘s multitude problems. Critics say that Sutiyoso 
wanted to create a new position for himself after serving his second term as Jakarta 
governor. Kompas newspaper ran a special Focus (Fokus) section debating the merit of this 
megapolitan concept that included a poll of people who were living in the Jabodetabekjur 
area. It is interesting to note that about fifty-four percent of the respondents said that they 
welcomed the idea. A majority seemed excited with the prospect of being labeled as 
Jakarta resident. They were also optimistic that the enlarged administrative region would 
help improve city planning, provide better housing and transportation, and would be 
generally conducive for businesses. But for the most important issue to which this concept 
                                                        
45 Semi-structured interview with Firdaus Ali through email, 4 September 2009. 
46 Semi-structured interview with Firdaus Ali through email, 4 September 2009. 
47 ―Proyek Mega Mencegah Banjir‖. 
48 DKI Pelajari Pola Pengaturan Deep Tunnel Kuala Lumpur, Suara Pembaruan, 23 July 2007. 
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was proposed, they said that they were not confident that it would solve the flood 
problem.49 
In addition to serving Sutiyoso‘s own political ambition, the tunnel project would 
seem to likely serve some of its strongest advocates politically. Most of the MPDT 
proponents worked with the Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB). In proposing 
this particular technical intervention, they seemed to want to increase and strengthen the 
role of this body in matters of a vital public service. When Suharto resigned, the Jakarta 
administration was forced to renegotiate the contracts it had with two private partners of 
PAM Jaya to distribute drinking water to Jakarta residents. Part of the stipulation of the 
Restated Cooperation Agreement, or RCA, signed in 2001, was the founding of the JWSRB 
whose role, according to H. Angga Indraswara, ―was to mediate the interests of all related 
parties in the implementation of the RCA. In addition, [the RCA allows] each of the five 
municipalities in Jakarta established a Komite Pelanggan Air Minum (Water Users‘ 
Committee), which would act as an advocacy group for the public.‖50 Indraswara points out 
that despite this RCA, many Jakartans, particularly the poor, still do not receive adequate 
clean waters for daily use because the private distributors treat water as other profit-
making commodities. He proposed to transform the role of the Water User‘s Committee 
―from water users into water ‗watchdogs‘ who ensure that the private water operators meet 
their responsibility to pursue the universal provision of clean water to all segments of the 
society.‖51  Such proposal would, of course, undermine the role of the regulatory body. One 
way to strengthen the role of the JWSRB was by showing to the public that it was serious in 
serving and protecting their interest. By claiming that the tunnel project would provide raw 
water to be processed and deliver to the public, the JWSRB as an institution would gain 
standing with the Jakarta administration as well. This would ensure the longevity of the 
Regulatory Body as a functioning organization.  To propose a solution that promises to 
solve several of Jakarta‘s water woes simultaneously was even better since it would 
enhance the Regulatory Body‘s reputation in the eyes of both the public and the state. 
As of December 2009, the status of the tunnel project was uncertain. Sutiyoso, the 
most prominent supporter of this project, after stepping down as governor of Jakarta 
expressed a bigger political ambition. He announced his intention to run in the country‘s 
July 2009 presidential election.52 His plan did not materialize, but his blatant display of 
political drive had a consequence that was deemed unfortunate by the MPDT backers. 
Then Vice President Jusuf Kalla asked him to set aside the pre-feasibility study of the 
PDT.53 In this case, technological development was tightly linked with political 
development. 
 
 
Biopore Holes 
While the tunnel proposal uses a more centralized approach with a small number of 
people involved, the advocates of the biopore holes (Lubang Resapan Biopori, LRB) 
emphasized a more democratic approach by highly encouraging any willing citizens to 
adopt the technology. Many people, in fact, were persuaded by the effectiveness of this 
technology and have created the biopore holes on their own. The inventor of the 
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technology, Kamir R. Brata, a soil scientist at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (Institut 
Pertanian Bogor, IPB), claimed that biopore holes help modify the soil ecosystem to allow 
more water to permeate underground and reduce the volume of household organic trash.   
The idea behind the technology was to create a 1-m deep, 10-cm diameter hole and 
to put some organic materials in the hole to attract and feed worms and other 
microorganisms that would create many tiny pores inside the hole.  This would transform 
impervious topsoil into a permeable layer allowing rainwater to trickle underground. The 
inventor claimed that the role of human would be ―simplified‖ and the effectiveness of the 
technology, in essence, would hinge upon successfully enrolling microorganisms in the 
soil.54  
Brata aggressively promoted the technology. One strategy he employed was to 
entice people to come to his laboratory. He declared that the drilling tool he came up with 
would not be patented and everyone would be welcome to copy and use it.  He was quoted 
to say, ―You‘re welcome to come to IPB‘s Soil Laboratory in Dramaga to see or duplicate 
the drilling tool. What matters to me is that people can learn about these biopore holes and 
deem them useful.‖55 Implicit in his statement is a strong desire to have this particular 
solution to reduce flooding to be one that could be widely adopted in Jakarta or in any 
other flood-prone regions.  
 Two months after the big flood engulfed Jakarta, Brata, his colleagues, 3000 IPB 
students, and Bogor politicians and residents drilled 5250 holes on April 22, 2007 (Earth 
Day) to signify the 525th anniversary of city of Bogor that year. Their effort captured the 
attention of the media.56 Subsequently, the public grew aware of this technology and 
residents in other cities decided to try to use it too.  Rachmat Witoelar, the country‘s then 
Minister of the Environment, and Jusuf Kalla, the vice president at the time, supported the 
technology.57  Their backings, however, were largely symbolic. The central government 
never issued a policy to push for this solution. Nor did the two politicians above have any 
direct role in spreading this technology to the masses. The city of Bogor acted on its own 
initiative. I think the mayor and local politicians wanted to promote not just the biopore 
technology, but also IPB, which is located there.  
On the occasion of the celebration of Environmental Day in June 2007, the city of 
Bogor awarded IPB‘s Rector Dr. Ahmad Ansori Mattjik and Kamir Brata for their efforts in 
raising the awareness about the environment and for inventing the biopore technology 
respectively.58 Their achievements helped foreground IPB as an academic institution to be 
reckoned with.  In one university ranking, IPB was placed fourth behind the University of 
Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, and Bandung Institute of Technology.59  The institute‘s 
reputation as one of the top universities in the country is well-known, but its brand as an 
agricultural institute has eroded over the past years since more than half of its graduates 
have not gone on to work in the agriculture sector.60 Brata‘s invention and reputation as a 
prominent soil scientist help IPB regain its reputation as the country‘s top place to study 
agriculture.  
In addition, since Brata claimed that his invention was an environmentally friendly 
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60 ―Perampingan ‗Institut Pleksibel Banget‘‖ Tempo, 4 May 2008. 
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technology, which many people seem to agree, the biopore hole helped underscore IPB‘s 
commitment to protecting the environment. In the media, Brata promoted his particular 
brand of environmental philosophy.  He was quoted as saying, ―An ecosystem is a system 
formed with interdependency between its components. All components must be 
considered in any conservation effort.‖61 In other words, he disliked the idea that solving 
water and waste problem requires shifting or moving the materials elsewhere in the 
environment resulting in the destruction of that area (e.g. open garbage disposal sites, 
effluent-laden rivers, etc.)  
Many advocates of this technology, who were consisted of not just the inventor, his 
colleagues, and IPB students, but also many regular citizens and politicians alike, liked to 
point out the ease of using this technology. One young blogger who lives in the nearby city 
of Bandung and works for a pharmaceutical company writes, 
 
I am one of those who disagree with the [East] Canal Flood project in Jakarta (and a 
similar project in Bandung if there is one). To me, the essence of the project is to 
channel water out to sea as soon as possible. Rainwater is God‘s blessing that we need 
to store underground. …Recently I found an interesting information about an 
alternative method to let water percolate underground. I found it in an interview 
transcript by Republika reporter with Kamir Raziudin Brata, an IPB researcher who has 
introduced a technology called biopore. …The technology is really simple, [you] just 
need to create 1-m deep and 10 cm diameter hole underground. …You can create the 
holes even in your small backyard. …I created about 10 biopore holes with family 
members in our backyard.62 
 
Blogs promoting the technology such as the one above numbered in dozens and were 
multiplying quite rapidly. They either contained the blogger‘s description, step-by-step 
instruction, assessment, or experience of making the holes. Several newspapers have also 
written about the technology and interviewed its inventor. Kompas, for example, has 
written considerably about the biopore holes, chronicling the growing popularity of the 
technology since it was introduced in Bogor in April 2007. In December 2007, on the onset 
of a flood season in Jakarta, a reporter for the newspaper strongly encouraged Jakartans to 
apply the technology. She wrote, ―Considering how easy and cheap it is to create biopore 
holes, there should not be any more excuses for Jakartans not to create them on their 
backyard. It‘s time for Jakarta residents participate to save Jakarta from floods.‖63 
A few Jakarta administration officials finally took notice. Mayor of Central Jakarta 
Sylviana Murni for example, said that there have been about 3000 biopore holes created in 
her region. But demands from Central Jakartans to construct biopore holes kept growing.64 
Brata and his team have calculated that the city would need 76 million holes to effectively 
prevent future flooding. Their proposal has, of course, met some criticisms. Firdaus Ali, 
who opposed this solution, contended that it would be better to halt aquifer discharge than 
to build 76 million biopore holes in Jakarta.65 Despite such comment, more and more 
Jakartans have taken up the technology.  As recently as in September 2009, the Indonesian 
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Red Cross created 5000 biopore holes in Jakarta and neighboring cities of Tangerang, and 
Bekasi to anticipate the upcoming flood season.66 
The wide adoption and eventually the planned massive scale implementation of this 
technology by the Jakarta‘s administration illustrate the successful strategies the Biopore 
supporters employed. Despite promises from some of the Jakarta administration officials to 
push for this solution in Jakarta, however, the city still fell short of the stated goal. 
Currently, there are 335,590 biopore holes in Jakarta, according to an official with the 
Jakarta administration, Muhayat.67 Jakarta Governor Fauzi Bowo issued an instruction No. 
197/2008 to speed up the creation of these biopore holes in the city, by requiring all the 20 
agencies of the Jakarta administration to create biopore holes in their areas.68 Brata has 
calculated that as much as thirty percent of the city‘s organic trash would be reduced by 
the 76 million holes and water runoff will be drastically minimized.69 The governor‘s decree 
maybe indicative of two things: first, that his Jakarta administration had faith in this 
technology to solve the flood problem, and second, it wanted the public to see that it was 
supporting the spread of popular technology, and hence the public‘s approval. The latter 
was more likely than the former as it was constructing its own solutions to the flood 
problem, such as the East Canal Flood project and the river dredging effort.  
 
 
Conclusion 
A new sociopolitical condition in Indonesia has facilitated a vibrant discourse in the 
wake of socio-technical disaster.  In a democratizing society such as Indonesia, state actors 
no longer monopolize the social production of risk objects. The public, who participate in 
the debate, help shape the networks of risks. Non-state actors manage to insert themselves 
into a sphere once dominated by the technocrats, in large part because the press was no 
longer controlled by the state. In doing so they exposed the messiness and vulnerability of 
a socio-technical system. The risky objects they identified run the whole gamut of entities 
that make up the entire system, which included water technologies, laws, practices, 
institutions, conditions, policies, and the environment. Not only did the actors identify 
multiple risk objects, but they also offered a variety of solutions to control or to displace 
them.  
The presence and participation of the public in the debate also help deconstruct the 
typical causal chains put forth by the state by producing new causal ones. For instance, a 
few actors challenged the notion that one of the major causes of flooding was the urban 
poor‘s settlement on the river embankments. They did so by constructing a chain of risk 
objects that ended up pointing to a state policy that allowed such condition to occur in the 
first place, namely centralized development.  The social construction of flooding risk in the 
city involves a constant battle of emplacing and displacing risky entities. Each act of 
emplacing and displacing a risk object was done with a particular motive to advance a 
certain objective. Embedded in many of the proposed solutions and the technical 
interventions was a certain goal that the actors want to accomplish. The agencies or 
institutions where these actors worked competed to grab both the public‘s and the state‘s 
attention and support. The stake in this competition was large. While many of them 
indicate that they wanted to prevent future flooding in the city, money, prestige, and power 
were also involved. Those whose ideas would be implemented or widely adopted stood to 
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gain a lot of income and recognition that would elevate their own and their institutions‘ 
reputations. These exercises in linking technology with politics were exemplified by the 
two flood solutions that I have discussed above. 
The debate also allowed many actors to contest the idea of modernity. Non-state 
actors continually challenged the state‘s understanding of what it meant to have a modern 
metropolis. They no longer bought the notion that to be modern Jakarta needed luxurious 
apartment complexes, malls, monuments, and skyscrapers. Many people made visible 
some of the problems that modernity brings: poverty, unemployment, inequity, illnesses, 
and technological risk. All the features of what the state thought made Jakarta modern 
were useless, many actors contended, if the city did not have functioning and adequate 
drainage, sewage, and transportation systems, protection from tidal flooding, green areas to 
absorb rainwater, affordable housing and job opportunities for the urban migrants, and 
other features they deemed to be equally important. Many people also pointed out that the 
2007 flood affected both the rich and the poor alike, and since the flood did not 
discriminate, city planning was supposed to account for all residents of the city.  
The debate about what Jakarta should do to reduce the risk of flooding in the city 
continued. As I have shown, although the Jakarta administration had come up with its own 
proposals and technical intervention, many Jakartans had taken up the biopore hole 
solution to show that they too have a stake in the future of Jakarta and needed to do 
something about it.   
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